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We provide yet another proof of the existence of calibrated forecasters; it has two merits. First, it is valid
for an arbitrary finite number of outcomes. Second, it is short and simple and it follows from a direct
application of Blackwell’s approachability theorem to carefully chosen vector-valued payoff function and convex
target set. Our proof captures the essence of existing proofs based on approachability (e.g., the proof by Fos-
ter [5] in case of binary outcomes) and highlights the intrinsic connection between approachability and calibration.
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1. Motivation. Foster [5] stated that:
Over the past few years many proofs of the existence of calibration have been discovered. Each
of the following provides a different algorithm and proof of convergence: Foster and Vohra [6, 8],
Hart [12], Fudenberg and Levine [10], Hart and Mas-Colell [13]. Does the literature really need
one more? Probably not.
In spite of this, he argued, successfully, that his new proof of the existence of calibrated forecasters in the
case of binary outcomes, based on Blackwell’s approachability theorem (Blackwell [1]), was shorter and
more direct than most of the previous proofs.
In this paper, we consider the general case of finitely many outcomes and exhibit an even shorter (ten-
line long) proof of the existence of calibrated forecasters based on approachability. We show therefore
that calibration is a straightforward consequence of approachability. As we realized by browsing on the
web, approachability and calibration are well-taught matters and we are confident that this new proof
will become a standard example in the list of direct applications of approachability (as is already the
case for the existence of no-regret forecasters). Since calibration is a central tool in learning in games
(see, e.g., Kakade and Foster [14]) and in online learning (see, e.g., Mannor, Tsitsiklis, and Yu [15]), the
simplicity of the proof and the guaranteed convergence rates open up new opportunities to use calibration
in practical learning algorithms.
Foster [5] mentions that his approachability-based proof of the existence of a calibrated forecaster
was obtained by first considering a modification of an intuitive forecaster already stated in Foster and
Vohra [6] and then working out the proof of its guarantees. We proceed the other way round and start
directly from the statement of Blackwell’s approachability theorem for convex sets [1, Theorem 3] but,
as a drawback, can only exhibit a forecaster which has to solve a linear program at each step. Taking
a closer look at Foster [5], one can see that we indeed capture the essence of his previous proof. His
algorithm is a clever modification, in the case of binary outcomes, of the general approachability-based
forecaster presented below; the former has a nice, explicit, and simple statement.
We now recall the informal definition and consequences of calibration. Consider a finite set of possible
outcomes and suppose we obtain random forecasts about future events; these forecasts are each given by
probability distributions over the outcomes. Now, such a sequence of forecasts is called calibrated when-
ever it is consistent in hindsight, that is, when, for all distributions p, the actual empirical distribution
of the outcomes on those rounds when the forecast was close to p is also close to p.
1
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Having a calibrated forecasting scheme is beneficial in several ways. On the one hand, it allows some
agent to choose the best responses to the predicted forecasts or to consider other risk measures which
might be more valuable than greedily choosing the best action leading to highest reward. On the other
hand, calibrated forecasting rules enable multiple agents to converge to a reasonable joint play in some
situations. For instance, if all players use calibrated forecasts of other players’ actions, then the empirical
distribution of action profiles converges to the set of correlated equilibria; see Foster and Vohra [7]. We
refer to Sandroni, Smorodinsky, and Vohra [19] for further discussion on calibrated forecasting as well as
its generalizations.
2. Setup and formal definition of calibration. We consider a finite set A of outcomes, with
cardinality denoted by A and denote by P = ∆(A) the set of probability distributions over A. We equip
P , which can be considered a subset of RA, with some1 norm ‖ · ‖, to be referred to as the calibration
norm. In particular, the Dirac probability distribution on some outcome a ∈ A will be referred to as δa.
A forecaster plays a game against Nature. At each step, it outputs a probability distribution Pt ∈ P
while Nature chooses simultaneously an outcome at ∈ A. We make no assumption on Nature’s strategy.
The goal of the forecaster is to ensure the following property, known as calibration: for all strategies
of Nature,
∀ ε > 0, ∀p ∈ P , lim
T→+∞
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{
‖Pt−p‖6ε
}(Pt − δat)
wwwww = 0 a.s. (1)
The a.s. statement accounts for randomized forecasters. (It was shown by Oakes [16] and Dawid [4] that
randomization is essential for calibration.)
The literature (e.g., Foster and Vohra [8], Foster [5]) essentially considers a less ambitious goal, at
least in a first step: ε–calibration. (We explain in Section 4.2 how to get a calibrated forecaster from
some sequence of ε–calibrated forecasters with good properties.) Formally, given ε > 0, an ε–calibrated
forecaster considers some finite covering of P by Nε balls of radius ε and abides by the following con-
straints. Denoting by p1, . . . ,pNε the centers of the balls in the covering (they form what will be referred
to later on as an ε–grid), the forecaster chooses only forecasts Pt ∈
{
p1, . . . ,pNε
}
. We thus denote by
Kt the index in
{
1, . . . , Nε
}
such that Pt = pKt . The final condition to be satisfied is then that for all
strategies of Nature,
lim sup
T→+∞
Nε∑
k=1
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{Kt=k}
(
pk − δat
)wwwww 6 ε a.s. (2)
When the calibration norm is the ℓ1–norm ‖ · ‖1, the sum appearing in this criterion is usually referred
to as the ℓ1–calibration score (Foster [5]). Another popular criterion is the Brier score (Foster and
Vohra [8]), which we consider in Section 4.3; it is bounded, up to a factor of 2, by the ℓ1–calibration
score.
3. A geometric construction of ε–calibrated forecasters. In this section we prove our main
result regarding the existence of an ε–calibrated forecaster based on approachability theory. We recall
results approachability theory, provide the main result (Theorem 3.2), and then address the issue of
computational complexity.
3.1 Statement of Blackwell’s approachability theorem. Consider a vector-valued game be-
tween two players, with respective finite action sets I and J . We denote by d the dimension of the
reward vector. The payoff function of the first player is given by a mapping m : I × J → Rd, which is
linearly extended to ∆(I) ×∆(J ), the set of product-distributions over I × J .
We denote by I1, I2, . . . and J1, J2, . . . the sequences of actions in I and J taken by each player (they
are possibly given by randomized strategies). Let C ⊂ Rd be some set. By definition, C is approachable
1The precise nature of this norm, e.g., ℓ1, Euclidian ℓ2, or ℓ∞ supremum norm, is irrelevant at this stage, since all norms
are equivalent on finite-dimensional spaces.
Mannor and Stoltz: A Geometric Proof of Calibration
Mathematics of Operations Research xx(x), pp. xxx–xxx, c©200x INFORMS 3
if there exists a strategy for the first player such that for all strategies of the second player,
lim
T→∞
inf
c∈C
wwwwwc− 1T
T∑
t=1
m
(
It, Jt
)wwwww = 0 a.s.
That is, the first player has a strategy that ensures that the average of his vector-valued payoffs converges
to the set C.
For closed convex sets C, there is a simple characterization of approachability that is a direct conse-
quence of the minimax theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Blackwell [1, Theorem 3]) A closed convex set C ⊂ Rd is approachable if and only
if
∀q ∈ ∆(J ), ∃p ∈ ∆(I), m(p,q) ∈ C .
3.2 Application to the existence of an ε–calibrated forecaster. As indicated above, we equip
P with some calibration norm ‖ · ‖ and fix ε > 0; we then consider an associated ε–grid {p1, . . . ,pNε} in
P = ∆(A).
Theorem 3.2 There exists an ε–calibrated forecaster which selects at every stage a distribution from this
grid.
Proof. We apply the results on approachability recalled above. To that end, we consider in our
setting the action sets I = {1, . . . , Nε} for the first player and J = A for the second player.
We define the vector-valued payoff function as follows; it takes values in RANε . For all k ∈ {1, . . . , Nε}
and a ∈ A,
m(k, a) =
(
0, . . . , 0, pk − δa, 0, . . . , 0
)
,
which is a vector of Nε elements of R
A composed by Nε − 1 occurrences of the zero element 0 ∈ RA and
one non-zero element, located in the k–th position and given by the difference of probability distributions
pk − δa.
We now define the target set C as the following subset of the ε–ball around
(
0, . . . , 0
)
for the calibration
norm ‖ · ‖. We write (ANε)–dimensional vectors of RANε as Nε–dimensional vectors with components in
R
A, i.e., for all x ∈ RANε ,
x =
(
x1, . . . , xNε
)
,
where xk ∈ RA for all k ∈ {1, . . . , Nε}. Then,
C =
{
x ∈ RANε :
Nε∑
k=1
‖xk‖ 6 ε
}
.
Note that C is a closed convex set.
The condition (2) of ε–calibration can be rewritten as follows: the sequence of the vector-valued
rewards
mT
def
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
m
(
Kt, at
)
=
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{Kt=1}
(
p1 − δat
)
, . . . ,
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{Kt=Nε}
(
pNε − δat
))
converges to the set C almost surely.
The existence of an ε–calibrated forecaster is thus equivalent to the approachability of C, which we
now prove by showing that the characterization provided by Theorem 3.1 is satisfied. Let q ∈ ∆(J ) = P .
By construction, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , Nε} such that ‖pk − q‖ 6 ε and thus
m(k,q) ∈ C .
(Here, the distribution p of the approachability theorem can be taken as the Dirac distribution δk.) 
4 Mannor and Stoltz: A Geometric Proof of CalibrationMathematics of Operations Research xx(x), pp. xxx–xxx, c©200x INFORMS
3.3 Computation of the exhibited ε–calibrated forecaster. The proof of the approachability
theorem gives rise to an implicit strategy, as indicated in Blackwell [1]. We denote here by ΠC the
projection in ℓ2–norm onto C.
At each round t > 2 and with the notations above, the forecaster should pick his action Kt at random
according to a distribution ψt =
(
ψt,1, . . . , ψt,Nε
)
on
{
1, . . . , Nε
}
such that
∀ a ∈ A,
(
mt−1 −ΠC
(
mt−1
)) · (m(ψt, a)−ΠC(mt−1)) 6 0 , (3)
where · denotes the inner product in RANε . The proof of Theorem 3.1 (see Blackwell [1]) shows that
such a distribution ψt indeed exists; the question is how to efficiently compute it. To do so, we first need
to compute the projection ΠC
(
mt−1
)
of mt−1.
We address the two computational issues separately. We first indicate how to find the projection
efficiently and then explain how to find the distribution ψt based on the knowledge of this projection.
3.3.1 Projecting onto C. We need to find the closest point in C to mt−1. Since C is convex and
the ℓ2–norm is convex, we have to deal with a minimization problem of a convex function over a convex
set. Since answering the question whether a given point is in C or not can be done in time linear in ANε,
the projection problem can be solved (approximately) in time polynomial in ANε.
Now, for the special case where the calibration norm is the ℓ1–norm ‖ · ‖1, we can do much better.
For i ∈ {1, . . . , ANε}, we denote by si,t−1 ∈ {−1, 1} the sign of the i–th component mi,t−1 of the vector
mt−1. (The value of the sign function at x is arbitrary at x = 0, equal to −1 when x < 0 and to 1 when
x > 0.) Then, ΠC
(
mt−1
)
is the solution of the following optimization problem, where the unknown is
y =
(
y1, . . . , yANε
)
:
min
∥∥y −mt−1∥∥22
such that


ANε∑
i=1
yi si,t−1 6 ε
yi si,t−1 > 0 , ∀ i ∈
{
1, . . . , ANε
}
.
It can be easily shown (as in Gafni and Bertsekas [11] or by an immediate adaptation of Palomar [17,
Lemma 1]) that the optimal solution is unique; it is given by y(µ∗) where for all µ > 0,
y(µ) = si,t−1
(
si,t−1mi,t−1 − µ
)+
and µ∗ is chosen as the minimum nonnegative value such that
∑
i yi(µ) si,t−1 6 ε. (Note that if µ
∗ > 0
then
∑
i yi(µ
∗) si,t−1 = ε.) Finding µ
∗ can be done by a binary search to an arbitrary precision.
In conclusion, when the calibration norm is the ℓ1–norm ‖ · ‖1, projecting onto C can be done in linear
time in ANε to a desired precision δ with complexity that depends on δ like log(1/δ).
3.4 Finding the optimal distribution ψt in (3). The question that has to be resolved is therefore
how to find ψt that satisfies condition (3). Since we know that such a ψt exists, it suffices, for instance,
to compute an element of
argmin
ψ
max
a∈A
(
mt−1 −ΠC
(
mt−1
)) · m(ψ, a) = argmin
ψ
max
a∈A
Nε∑
k=1
ψk γk,a,t−1
where we denoted γk,a,t−1 =
(
mt−1 −ΠC
(
mt−1
)) · m(k, a).
This can be done efficiently by linear programming leading to a polynomial complexity in Nε and A.
However, if instead of solving the minimax problem exactly we are satisfied with solving it approx-
imately, i.e., allowing a small violation δ > 0 in each of the A constraints given by (3), we can use
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the multiplicative weights algorithm as explained in Freund and Schapire [9]; see also Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi [2, Section 7.2]. The complexity of such a solution would be
O
(
ANε
δ2
lnNε
)
,
since (lnNε)/δ
2 steps of complexity ANε each have to be performed.
The proof of Blackwell’s approachability theorem shows that in this case the sequence of the average
payoff vectors mt converges rather to the
√
δ–expansion (in ℓ2–norm) of C; it is easy2 to see that the
latter is included in the δ–expansion (in ℓ1–norm) of C.
Putting all things together and taking the ℓ1–norm ‖ · ‖1 as the calibration norm (in particular, to
define C), we can find a 2ε–calibrated forecaster whose complexity is of the order of ANε ε
−2 logNε at
each step. Since Nε behaves like ε
−(A−1) we have that the dependence of the complexity per stage behaves
like ε−(A+1) (ignoring multiplicative and logarithmic factors). This implies a polynomial dependence in
ε but an exponential dependence in A.
Remark 3.1 It is worth noting that when choosing a solution ψt, it is not possible to replace ψt with
its mean or with an element of p1,p2, . . . ,pNε that is close to its mean. The reason is that this would
give rise to a deterministic rule, which, as we mentioned in Section 2, cannot be calibrated. The fact
that we have to randomize rather than take the mean is due to our construction of the vector-valued
game; therein, playing a mixed action ψt over the pi’s leads to a very different vector-valued reward than
playing the (element pk closest to the) mean of the mixed action. This is because different indices of the
(ANε)–dimensional space are involved.
4. Rates of convergence and construction of a calibrated forecaster. In this section we
provide rates of convergence and discuss the construction of a calibrated (rather than ε–calibrated)
forecaster. We finally compare our results to some existing calibrated forecasters in the literature.
The main result of this section is providing rates of convergence for a calibrated forecaster in (5). To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first rates results for calibration for an alphabet of size A larger
than 2. For A = 2, (sub)optimal rates follow from the procedure of Foster and Vohra [8] as recalled in
Section 4.3.2.
4.1 Rates of convergence. Approachability theory provides uniform convergence rates of sequence
of empirical payoff vectors to the target set, see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2, Exercise 7.23]. Formally,
denoting by ‖ · ‖2 the Euclidian ℓ2–norm in RANε , it follows in our context that there exists some absolute
constant γ (independent of A and Nε) such that for all strategies of Nature and for all T , with probability
1− δ, wwmT −ΠC(mT )ww2 6 γ
√
ln(1/δ)
T
.
Here, it is crucial to state the convergence rates based on the Euclidian norm because of an underlying
martingale convergence argument in Hilbert spaces proved by Chen and White [3]. The reason why the
convergence rate here is independent of A and Nε is that the payoff vectors m(k, a) all have an Euclidian
norm bounded by an absolute constant, e.g., 2; this happens because most of their components are 0.
We now apply this result. However, we underline that the set C can be defined by a different calibration
norm ‖ · ‖; below, we will define it based on the ℓ1–norm, for instance. But the stated uniform convergence
rate can be used since, via a triangle inequality and an application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
‖mT ‖1 6
wwΠC(mT )ww1 +wwmT −ΠC(mT )ww1 6 ε+√ANε wwmT −ΠC(mT )ww2 .
Nε is of the order of ε
−(A−1); we let γ′ be an absolute constant such that Nε 6 γ
′ ε−(A−1) for all ε 6 1
(say). We therefore have proved that given 0 < ε 6 1, the forecaster defined in the previous section is
such that for all strategies of Nature and for all T , with probability 1− δ,
‖mT ‖1 =
Nε∑
k=1
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{Kt=k}
(
pk − δat
)wwwww
1
6 ε+ γγ′
√
A
√
ln(1/δ)
ε(A−1) T
def
= Uε,T,δ .
2It suffices to note that for all vectors ∆ of a finite-dimensional space, one has ‖∆‖∞ 6 ‖∆‖2, so that the inequality
‖∆‖2 6
√
‖∆‖∞ ‖∆‖1 yields
√
‖∆‖2 6 ‖∆‖1.
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This high-probability bound is to be used below as the key ingredient to construct a calibrated forecaster,
i.e., a forecaster satisfying (1). Combining the Borel-Cantelli Lemma with the bound above shows that
the less ambitious goal (2) can be achieved.
4.2 Construction of a calibrated forecaster. We use a standard approach which is commonly
known as the “doubling trick,” see, e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2]. It consists of defining a meta-
forecaster that proceeds in regimes; regime r (where r > 1) lasts Tr rounds and resorts for the forecasts
to an εr–calibrated forecaster, for some εr > 0 to be defined by the analysis. We now show that for
appropriate values of the Tr and εr, the resulting meta-forecaster is calibrated in the sense of (1), and
even uniformly calibrated in the following sense, where B denotes the Borel sigma-algebra of P :
lim
T→+∞
sup
B∈B
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{Pt∈B}
(
Pt − δat
)wwwww = 0 a.s. (4)
Of course, uniform calibration (4) implies calibration (1) via the choices for B given by ε–balls around
probability distributions p.
For concreteness, we focus below on the ℓ1–calibration score.
Regimes are indexed by r = 1, 2, . . . and the index of the regime corresponding to round T is referred to
as RT . The set of the rounds within regime r 6 RT − 1 is called Tr; rounds in regime RT with index less
than T are gathered in the set TRT (we commit here an abuse of notations). We denote by pk,r, where
k ∈ {1, . . . , Nεr}, the finite εr–grid considered in the r–th regime. By the triangle inequality satisfied by
‖ · ‖, we first decompose the quantity of interest according to the regimes and to the played points of the
grids, wwwww
T∑
t=1
I{Pt∈B}
(
Pt − δat
)wwwww
1
6
RT∑
r=1
Nεr∑
k=1
I{pk,r∈B}
wwwww
∑
t∈Tr
I{Kt=k}
(
pk,r − δat
)wwwww
1
.
We now substitue the uniform bound obtained in the previous section and get that with probability
1− (δ1,T + . . .+ δRT ,T ) > 1− 1/T 2,
sup
B∈B
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{Pt∈B}
(
Pt − δat
)wwwww
1
6
1
T
RT∑
r=1
Tr Uεr ,Tr,δr,T ,
where we defined δr,T = 1/(2
rT 2).
An application of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma and Cesaro’s Lemma shows that for suitable choices of a
sequence εr decreasing towards 0 and an increasing sequence Tr such that ε
A−1
r Tr tends to infinity fast
enough, one then gets the desired convergence (4). For instance, if Tr = 2
r, and εr is chosen such that
εr and
√
1
ε
(A−1)
r Tr
are of the same order of magnitude, e.g., εr = 2
−r/(A+1), then
lim sup
T→∞
T 1/(A+1)√
lnT
sup
B∈B
wwwww 1T
T∑
t=1
I{Pt∈B}
(
Pt − δat
)wwwww
1
6 ΓA a.s. , (5)
where the constant ΓA depends only on A. As indicated above, to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first rates results for calibration for an alphabet of size A larger than 2.
4.3 Comparison to previous forecasters.
4.3.1 ℓ1–calibration score. Foster [5] first considered the ℓ1–calibration score in the context of the
prediction of binary outcomes only, i.e., when A = 2. The ε–calibrated forecaster he explicitly exhibited
has a computational complexity of the order of 1/ε. He did not work out the convergence rates but since
his procedure is mostly a clever twist on our general procedure, they should be similar to the ones we
proved in Section 4.1.
Mannor and Stoltz: A Geometric Proof of Calibration
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4.3.2 Brier score. What follows is extracted from Foster and Vohra [8]; see also Cesa-Bianchi and
Lugosi [2, Section 4.5].
Given an ε–grid over the simplex P , we define, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , Nε}, the empirical distribution of
the outcomes chosen by Nature at those rounds t when the forecaster used pk,
ρT (k) =


pk if
∑T
t=1 I{Kt=k} = 0,
T∑
t=1
I{Kt=k}
1∑T
t=1 I{Ks=k}
δat if
∑T
t=1 I{Kt=k} > 0.
The classical Brier score can be shown in our setup to be equal to the following criterion:
Nε∑
k=1
‖ρT (k)− pk‖22
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
I{Kt=k}
)
.
Since for two probability distributions p and q of P , one always has
‖p− q‖22 6 2 ‖p− q‖1 ,
the Brier score can be seen to be upper bounded by twice the ℓ1–calibration score; it is thus a weaker
criterion.
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2, Section 4.5] shows however that forecasters with Brier scores asymptot-
ically smaller than ε can be the keystones to construct calibrated forecasters, in a way similar to the
construction exhibited in Section 4.2.
In the case A = 2, these forecasters essentially bound the Brier score, with probability at least 1− δ,
by a term that is of the order of
ε+
1
ε
√
ln(1/ε) + ln(1/δ)
T
,
which is worse than the rate we could exhibit in Section 4.1 for the ℓ1–calibration score.
In addition, the computational complexity of the underlying procedure (based on the minimization of
internal regret) is of the order of 1/ε2 per stage and thus is similar to the complexity 1/εA+1 = 1/ε2 we
derived in Section 3.3 for our new procedure.
The general case of A > 3 is briefly mentioned in Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2, Section 4.5] indicating
that the case of A = 2 can be extended to A > 3 without further details. As far as we can say, the
computational complexity of such an extension per step would be of the order of 1/ε2(A−1) versus 1/ε(A+1)
for the approachability-based procedure we suggested above. The convergence rates, for a straightforward
extension, seem to be quite slow. However, based on a draft of the present article, Perchet [18] recently
proposed a more efficient extension of the procedure of Foster and Vohra [8] and obtained the same rates
of convergence as in (5); he however did not work out the complexity of his procedure, which seems to
be similar to the one of our construction.
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